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The old and the new 
Over recent decades, there has been a shift in the perception of the purpose of 
universities, and this has been accompanied by substantial cultural, academic and 
management change. In Australian universities, the discarding of the old view of  
‘The University’ can be given a date, more-or-less. The Australian Commonwealth 
Government's policy document of 1988, the White Paper1, foreshadowed many 
changes in universities. The ideas in the White Paper had been around for some time 
and can be traced back to the sixties. Pressures for change came from business and 
from economic and cultural changes in society. New technologies contributed to 
change and to the need for people trained to deal with a greater complexity in society.  
There were pressures also from within universities, from administrators and 
staff who were critical of the older culture, and who took their cue from government 
and wider society. The White Paper, when it finally came, had a dramatic effect. 
Change, it seemed, was to come all at once in a new ‘unified national system’ of 
universities. The ensuing twenty five-plus years saw a consistent direction in higher 
education policy. However, the changes came gradually over a long period, and it is 
relatively recent that the accumulated consequences have become more obvious. 
There was undoubtedly within the universities themselves a degree of enthusiasm for 
the White Paper policies, notably from management, and from more socially 
concerned academics, although for different reasons. 
Some consequences of the White Paper were that universities were to raise 
more of their own funds so that over time they became essentially businesses, student 
numbers increased, distinctions between colleges and universities were abolished, 
collegiality withered as management became ‘top-down’, and government exerted a 
form of indirect control over universities by imposing a new, repetitious, and 
promotional language which reflected changed priorities. 
Perhaps the most fundamental of the White Paper policies was the change in the 
basis on which higher education could expect to receive government funding. Thus, 
noting a hint of menace, we read: 
In developing their teaching proposals related to growth in the system, institutions will be 
expected to give priority to disciplines relevant to national social, economic and industrial 
development needs.2	
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Of course, the pervasiveness of economic considerations has not been restricted to 
education policy. The dominance of liberal economics in public policy has affected 
even those policy areas seen previously as incompatible with a pure economic 
viewpoint. Thus, Coaldrake and Stedman are almost certainly correct when they 
wrote recently:  
It is probably the case that the contemporary university will stand or fall on the perceptions of 
its economic benefits.3  
In the older culture, universities were seen importantly as cultural institutions 
contributing to society by virtue of their difference from wider society. In the new 
culture, universities were seen as contributing to society by virtue of their 
incorporation into society. It is arguable that in Australia the ideas of John Henry 
Newman4, as a representative of the older culture, had little effect, although the 
cultural aspect of universities was strong in the educational ideas and policies of Sir 
Robert Menzies.5 However, the discussion about the purpose of ‘The University’ is 
still alive to an extent, as evidenced by the exchange of views between Raymond 
Gaita and Glyn Davis.6 The changes have been all the greater for universities in that, 
over the same period that they were changing to conform more to society, society 
itself was in a state of flux as a broader sense of community faded, liberal economics 
dominated public policy, and human activities were reduced to their material, 
economic  and competitive aspects. These changes are considered in the remainder of 
this paper under some of their different aspects. In turn these are: knowledge, 
teaching, scholarship and education; language, marketing and management; and the 
wider issues arising, for the changes in universities can be seen as consequences of    
substantial cultural and economic changes in western societies.   
   
The new attitudes to knowledge, teaching, scholarship and education  
One change that occurred was the abolition of many prerequisites for study, which 
were replaced by ‘assumed knowledge’. This meant that the ultimate responsibility as 
to the prior knowledge needful for a course or subject was placed upon the student, 
even though the student often was not in a position to make an informed judgment.  
The changes in prerequisite policy were pragmatic, so as to facilitate enrolment 
of a broader range of students, by removing barriers to enrolment. But pragmatic 
changes can have wider implications. In this case, knowledge implicitly was seen as 
having less structure, so that a logical order or progression of subjects became of 
lesser importance. This was consonant with the idea that knowledge consisted of 
discrete bits of information, not necessarily with an overall structure, unity, or logical 
development. The changes had a greater effect on disciplines where knowledge is 
more structured and builds on prior understanding, but the changes were regarded 
purely as management decisions that had no consequences other than facilitating 
enrolments.7,8  
Managements installed assessment regimes that accentuated the idea of 
knowledge and education as information. So-called ‘continuous’ assessment involves 
assessments at relatively frequent intervals that may split a subject into discrete parts. 
As well, more complicated regimes of assessment became more common, and these 
generally have had more assessments. More assessment is attractive to the new 
culture, because assessment is tangible, and can be measured concretely. By 
identifying something that is tangible although peripheral to the actual quality of 
teaching, with the quality of teaching itself, a complex assessment regime provides 
apparent evidence of innovative and high quality teaching, and of ‘student centred 
learning’. In fact, it is intrinsic to teaching that its actual quality is intangible so that 
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there is an intrinsic conceptual and practical resistance to making of quality a tangible 
and measurable notion.9,10,11 The quality of teaching and education relates neither 
simply to procedures nor to information acquired, but to the individual internal 
experience of the student – and although student surveys may yield useful 
information, ultimately this is a matter for judgement, not measurement.  
Whatever one thinks on these matters, imposed requirements and complex 
assessment regimes do, in many subjects, create treadmills of assessment and great 
strains upon students and staff, but there is no official concern and little awareness of 
the effects. The idea of helping a much more diverse body of students pass their 
exams by having frequent assessments may well have had a certain success, but it has 
been achieved at the cost of narrowing the concept, perception and experience of 
education, of blurring the distinction between university and school, of perceiving 
education primarily as training and information acquisition, and of placing lesser 
emphasis on student independence.  
An irony in this situation is that the perceived need for more assessments shows 
a lack of confidence in the students, and fails to provide them with an environment 
that encourages them to become ‘independent learners’, an often-stated objective.  
Learning and education in a fuller sense mean that students need time to reflect, to 
contemplate, to analyse, to explore, and to unify their ideas. Instead of this, there is 
imposed a continual round of busyness and assessments, as learning is reduced to bits 
and the acquisition of technical skills. The above issues relate also to common 
pressures on education in schools, and a response to the latter has been well and 
movingly expressed by G. J. Stroud, a former primary school teacher: 
Apparently I'm more valuable as an assessor, an examiner, a data collector: I have to 
dull my once-engaging lesson sequences. Now I must begin by planning the 
assessment, consider how students will show what they've learnt and pre-determine 
what they are going to learn …. it is mechanical and rigid and driven.…This testing 
costs me dearly -- it costs me time  with my learners, it costs my energy, it costs me 
the trust of my students. But it's costing Australia too -- the price of our young 
minds and their desire to learn.12 
A further force in the attitudes to university education is technology. Students 
now are likely to attend lectures much less frequently, and take lecture material from 
their university's website (which as well as printed material often includes video 
recordings of lectures), or from a multitude of on-line sources. Again, the effect is to 
fragment learning, and to reduce it to information -- the individual characteristics and 
intellectual personality of the lecturer, and what the lecturer can bring to a student's 
learning, are lost. Over time, technology may be able to provide a learning that is 
more of an education, but it seems more likely that it will reinforce the dominant 
notion of learning as information acquisition.  
Other factors affecting attitudes to knowledge have been liberal economics and 
postmodernism. Under the dominating ideas of a type of liberal economics in public 
policy, which I shall call market economics, all services, including education, are 
regarded as only supplied according to market demand. This is reflected, for example, 
in the view that students are no more than customers or clients. The underlying 
assumptions of market economics and its implicit view of society received little 
critical examination. In fact, at times, market economics seemed to be a quasi-
religious faith in the infallible wisdom of markets and an invariably benign ‘invisible 
hand’.13 At the same time, this view of how best society should operate was presented 
as a self-evident truth, and it affected the way universities understood themselves and 
their relationship to society -- universities used a commercial and business language 
to describe their activities and their concept of themselves. Consequently, there were 
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effects on the universities' attitude to knowledge, as tangible areas of study with a 
more direct and immediate relationship with wider society became more valued, 
while less tangible areas were devalued. This was, of course, in line with the thinking 
in the White Paper -- within the universities, the policy ideas of the White Paper and 
market economics interacted with and reinforced each other.  The idea of the market, 
when transferred to institutions traditionally associated with disinterested knowledge 
and truth, now turned knowledge and truth into commodities to be valued by a 
market. This process has a certain subtlety, and acts indirectly by changing the 
internal language of discourse and imposing continual management change.  
More or less concurrently, postmodernism became very influential in the 
humanities and social sciences, and looked upon knowledge and truth as proxies for 
power, while at the same time regarding a group which asserts a certain agreed-upon 
narrative as creating its own truths. In this view, truths are essentially no more than 
social constructions -- that is, truths are social beliefs rather than knowledge, and may 
be derived from individual or group interest, history, or tradition. One the one hand, if   
a more powerful group asserts truths, within this thinking such truths are likely to be 
regarded as illegitimate assertions of power, and purported knowledge a front for a 
hidden purpose of oppression. Thus, whereas at one time, truth was regarded as a way 
of challenging power, now, to the postmodern mind, it became a manifestation of it. 
On the other hand, truths asserted by a less powerful group are more likely to be 
regarded as valid and their truths as legitimate dissent. In either case, under the 
postmodern approach, truth becomes socially constructed, relative and political. This 
re-orientates our concepts of knowledge and truth which, traditionally, were 
considered as standing outside individuals and groups. Nevertheless, and 
unavoidably, the need to validate the legitimacy of one body of relative ‘truth’ against 
that of another persisted (as it still does), but such validation is impossible when the 
possibility of over-arching judgment or agreement has been denied. This created both 
an epistemological and practical impasse for postmodernism, since a statement 
subsequent to the idea that truth is relative cannot rationally claim the authority of a 
wider truth. It is arguable that a reason for the waning of postmodern ideas in the 
humanities and social sciences is a perception that because they negate themselves, 
they are not an effective means to achieve change in society.14 
In any case, whether one supports the near-universal applicability of market 
economics, or whether one is some type of quasi-Marxist postmodernist, over-arching 
intellectual judgments are suspended as knowledge and truth are both commercialised 
and politicised, and diminished either to market values, or to a suspected form of 
oppression. The potential moral import of learning and the attainment of knowledge is 
removed, as the latter are diluted and become subservient to commerce and power. 
In some areas of the humanities and social science, one can receive the 
impression that academic work and the pursuit of truth are now regarded as secondary 
to social aims.  At the same time, under market economics the values and language 
universities use conform to government policy and the commercial culture to which 
they have no longer an imaginable alternative. The broader danger is that history, 
truth and practicalities of implementation cannot be accepted for what they are, but 
must be made to conform to pre-determined ideologies and presumed worthy ends. 
Consequently, the actual solution of problems is rendered more difficult, as resolution 
of them depends upon seeing things more from a distance, and as they are. But if 
knowledge is no more than relative, and only validated by a group having a certain 
agreed or imposed view that is not open to challenge, knowledge no longer exists, and 
universities cease to have any value. 
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 Given the above, it is not surprising that the perceived value of scholarship also 
has been greatly affected by the new culture. In line with the notion that a university 
is a business, universities place great importance on auditing individual performance 
and measuring outcomes, accompanied by a ‘tick the box’ mentality. This mentality 
recognises only activities that are tangible, easily measured, and that are frequently 
directed to meeting the criteria of the international ranking tables. Consequently, 
intangible activities are devalued. Thus, concerning scholarship, Belinda Probert 
writes:  
….there is little evidence that the terms ‘scholar’ and ‘scholarship’ are used easily within 
Australian universities to describe distinctive values or qualities. …..Newer higher education 
providers find it difficult to excite their teachers about its relevance.15 
The situation is further confused as ‘scholarship’ is now being used as a way to 
legitimise teaching in comparison with research. The ‘scholarship of teaching’ often 
now refers to research into teaching practice. In this way of thinking, good teaching is 
re-defined as a type of research, and we reach a ridiculous conclusion -- namely, 
teaching is to be seen as being as valuable as research because it is research. That is 
what happens when intangible and qualitative notions (in this case good teaching and 
scholarship), are artificially forced into quantitative categories (in this case the 
number of research publications). Scholarship as traditionally understood, and other 
vital but intangible notions, have no place in this type of thinking.  
The nature and potential of scholarship in the old sense can perhaps be 
illustrated by looking at an example. C. S. Lewis' book ‘The Discarded Image’ 16, on 
the passing of the Aristotelian and medieval conceptions of the world and the 
universe, is at once a description based on wide erudition, a balancing of differing 
viewpoints, and a synthesis and integration of the many ideas of the nature of the 
heavens up to the end of the medieval period.  However, and above all (and this is 
only possible because of the preceding qualities), it is a reconstruction and 
participation of great imagination and warmth of the people, minds and times within 
its historical purview. It provides a means not only of thinking about the past, but 
about ourselves, posing, as Lewis does, the general question of how beliefs and 
cultural attitudes in any time come to be discarded, or embraced. It reminds us that 
change involves loss, whatever might be gained. And yet, it is precisely that loss that 
can enable the past to shed light upon the present and enable us to see it more clearly. 
The fuller idea of scholarship carries within it notions of trying to integrate 
knowledge, understand the whole, see things in perspective, and calls upon the whole 
person to make intellectual, disinterested and humane judgments. It nearly always 
involves some sort of historical awareness, the lack of which is a characteristic of our 
culture, to which Steiner has alluded in a literary context as a ‘dimming of 
recognitions’17. Scholarship may take different forms but, ideally, it involves the 
whole person and has a greater breadth that is not necessarily required in research, 
because research can be narrow and specialised – and this is even necessary in more 
technical research. The new culture values research because it is considered to be  
measurable by research publications, and this is the most significant factor, overall, in 
international university rankings.  But the qualities of scholarship, seen from within 
the present culture, are vague, not directed to specific and tangible ends, lacking in 
discernible economic benefits, and so are of questionable merit. 
Related to all of these matters is our concept of education. In the older sense, 
education is intangible and organic, in that it extends beyond the acquisition of 
specific facts, information, training and techniques and cannot be reduced to a mere 
combination of these. But education is now thought of as a machine, each part of 
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which carries out a specific, tangible task, the collection of which tasks supposedly 
will produce an inevitable and pre-determined result -- it's seen simply as a matter of 
getting the tasks and procedures right, with the overall process being called ‘quality 
assurance’.  
Under the culture of relentless auditing, frequent assessments, and performance 
evaluation, what is intangible is ignored at best and dismissed at worst. Thus, 
education is now conflated with assessment, adherence to procedures, the acquisition 
of specific information, technical skills and enthusiasm for change and approved 
attitudes. Education is now in danger of becoming no more than its associated 
epiphenomena. This is a type of reductionism, and is epitomised by the ‘tick the box’ 
mentality that, Facebook-like, encourages our response to complex issues to be ‘like’ 
or ‘dislike’ as the only possibilities.  
 
Language, marketing and management in higher education 
In the older culture, universities did not conceive of themselves as businesses but 
rather as cultural and intellectual institutions. Universities then did not have the 
problem of ‘promoting’ themselves, as they do today.  In accordance with their new 
conception of themselves as businesses, and as a means of indicating conformity with 
government policy, language in universities now is often little more than a marketing 
and promotional tool. The use of language continually to assure, to promote and to 
place all activities in a positive light, is misleading at best and dishonest at worst. It 
induces a numbing conformity, and prevents the open discussion of problems. As in 
George Orwell's ‘Newspeak’, it narrows the range of thought, and that is one of its 
implicit purposes. 
A common technique for manipulating language is to use phrases that are ‘non-
contestable’ and so conformity with them becomes obligatory. For example, ‘best 
practice’ has been a phrase very popular in universities -- the use of the word ‘best’ 
implies that the phrase is non-contestable. In fact, ‘best practice’ is mostly a vacuous 
concept because there is no agreed ‘best’, and this is especially the case in education 
and teaching. Use of this phrase implies that shared agreement is not only possible but 
obligatory, and so enforces conformity. Another example is ‘quality assurance’, 
which is non-contestable because it supposedly assures quality. Of course, ‘quality 
assurance’ does not refer to actual quality, but to procedures that are peripheral to 
quality itself, although it is found generally useful to conflate the two. These are 
examples where language is used to induce conformity, but also for an attempted 
grandiose effect. This striving for ‘grandiosity’ permeates universities, but also our 
wider culture, as analysed in detail by Alvesson.18 
‘Innovation’ is also a highly regarded word in universities, and it has the 
broadest meaning possible -- that is, it encompasses any sort of change, and is 
regarded as an automatic good. This means that there is pressure to acquiesce in 
change whatever it might be. The word ‘innovation’ often functions as yet another 
attempt at grandiosity and its overuse creates expectations on individuals to 
demonstrate their willingness to innovate regardless of circumstances, and so puts 
pressure on them to conform to a particular management philosophy. In any case, 
plenty of innovations in universities have a short life and are not thoroughly tested or 
implemented, conveniently leaving space for the next innovation. As well, the 
repetitive use of a single word reduces the value of the word when it is used 
legitimately. Other examples of some words and phrases used in a similarly 
manipulative way over the years are: ‘world class’, ‘education industry’, 
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‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, ‘leadership’, ‘flagship courses’, ‘student-centred 
learning’, ‘branding’ and ‘continuous improvement’.  
Another notable language use has been to refer to students as ‘customers’ or 
‘clients’. The use of the former goes back to the early days after the White Paper, and 
its use was defended by some on the basis that it would force academics to take a 
more responsible attitude to their teaching. However, the commercial connotation of 
‘customer’ and ‘client’ promotes a different notion of the relationship between 
academics as teachers, and students. The phrase ‘teacher and student’ suggests a 
positive mutuality of relationship, even a potential partnership, whereas a customer 
merely pays for a service in a business transaction. The use of ‘customer’ distorts 
what should be the relationship between the teacher and the student, and narrows 
conceptions of what that relationship might be. Of course, that is what it was intended 
also to do. But while it was a legitimate grievance against the old culture, that all too 
often academics had little concern for students' interests and their teaching was given 
with a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude, distorting language in this way was neither a 
desirable nor a necessary way to deal with the issue. 
An effect of regarding students as customers is that ‘customer’ expectations 
should be met. However, to varying degrees, university students set their expectations 
by past experience, without an awareness that one's conceptions and experience may 
be limited and restrictive. So, if meeting the expectations of students as customers 
takes precedence over presenting challenging new ideas and experiences, students' 
education will be more limited, less interesting, and of lesser benefit to students than 
it might have been. 
Discussion concerning universities is often confused, in part due to the 
artificiality of the dominant language, and the indiscriminate use of words and phrases 
without regard to details or context. The language, its content and its intent then 
become opaque, greatly adding to the difficulty in discussing issues. More generally, 
our society and public debate also are affected also by the quality of language, and 
one might argue that universities are simply taking the practice of wider society as 
validating their own use of language.19  
In a recent paper, Belinda Probert draws attention to consequences of the gap 
between the language used in relation to ‘quality’ and the reaction of many academics 
to it as being irrelevant to their actual work as teachers and researchers.20 There is 
also a view that the opaque language used in university documents has led to an 
external lack of confidence and lack of trust.21 In 1979 the American historian and 
social critic Christopher Lasch wrote:  
Mass education, which began as a promising attempt to democratise the higher culture of the 
privileged classes, has ended by stupefying the privileged themselves. Modern society has 
achieved unprecedented rates of formal literacy, but at the same time it has produced new forms 
of illiteracy.22 
Essentially, that is what happened in universities following the White Paper. The 
marketing culture within universities now promotes a new form of illiteracy, as 
universities use a language that manipulates while giving itself intellectual 
pretensions, obfuscates instead of clarifying, relies on slogans and not thought, strives 
continually to impress, and avoids discussion of issues.  
One difficulty in university management is that major issues cannot be 
separated from each other, and yet within universities policy is often introduced with 
a single objective in mind, without regard to wider effects. This might be termed a 
reductionist philosophy of management, as opposed to one that is organic. This is an 
effect of the adoption in management theory (so it is imagined) of the positivist 
approach to knowledge found in science, without regard to its appropriateness or 
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legitimacy in a different context. This manifests itself in the crudity of the auditing 
culture with its ‘tick the box’ mentality and its exclusion of the intangible.  
A further consequence of frequent assessments for large classes is that the effort 
of administration increases dramatically, as subject coordinators must answer many 
emails concerning queries on subject tutorials and examination procedures, 
applications for assessments or examinations missed through illness or personal 
circumstances, and make arrangements for those assessments to be carried out  (levels 
of support for such tasks can vary greatly within universities). Nearly all of this is 
clerical work carried out, in plenty of cases, by both senior and junior academics. As 
Coaldrake and Stedman say: 
 ….within universities there is chronic discontent with constraints on time and resources, and 
dissatisfaction with management. Strains are evident in traditional academic cultures with 
increasing work pressures, more intrusive regulation by government and close involvement with 
the world of commerce, as well as diversification of roles and disparities in rewards ... it is far 
too simplistic to assume that the traditional academic workload breakdown of 40 per cent 
teaching, 40 percent research and 20 per cent service applies across all academics and all 
universities …… In reality, there is enormous variation  within and among universities in the 
balance and intensity of various aspects of academic work.23 
However, despite such clearly-identified problems, it is part of the new culture that 
the trivialisation of academic work is not a matter of concern. Rather, such problems 
are simply ignored, and new procedures are constantly introduced in addition to 
existing ones in the name of  ‘innovation’ and ‘quality assurance’. 
For those academics involved, the time spent on coordinating a subject may 
detract markedly from the quality of teaching, especially in an under-resourced 
environment.  The underlying attitude seems to be: ‘teaching goes ahead as matter of 
course, but what is really important is setting your aims, goals, objectives, outcomes 
and procedures, writing them out in detail, and meeting the assessment and reporting 
requirements set by management’. These and such procedures are called ‘quality 
assurance’ and, within the new culture, the extent to which they are met is often 
implicitly held to display actual teaching quality.   
 
Wider considerations and conclusion 
As mentioned earlier, the book by C. S. Lewis, ‘The Discarded Image’, was about the 
passing of the medieval world view. But just as the medieval view was discarded, in 
our own times older conceptions of ‘The University’ likewise have been discarded.  
Lewis points out that the different languages used to describe the old medieval view 
and the new scientific view were metaphorical, and writes: 
The old language continually suggests a sort of continuity between purely physical events and 
our most spiritual aspirations.	24 
The new scientific language omitted a transcending spiritual dimension, and broke the 
link between physical events and a spiritual awareness. In this sense, the scientific 
language was a step in the direction of modern secularism.25	
But at the same time, the new scientific outlook accepted a transcendent realm -
- that of knowledge, truth and the effectiveness of the intellect. This is what 
Coaldrake and Stedman refer to in a more secular sense as ‘a universal framework for 
understanding’26. It was an implicit perception of a transcendent realm of knowledge 
and truth that was, perhaps, the single most defining characteristic of the old 
university culture.  
In our own times, there has been a corresponding change in language as the 
older idea of a university has been discarded, with the new language in universities 
being emotionally and intellectually limited, purely utilitarian, and displaying little or 
no historical awareness. The scientific revolution in the seventeenth century greatly 
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diminished the identification of the transcendent with a personal and omnipotent God, 
and secularised the transcendent by removing it to a colder and more remote place of 
stricter knowledge and intellect, although that place remained accessible to a secular 
affirmation, and even to a religious affirmation of a less personal kind. In our own 
times the possibility of even that secular affirmation is itself being removed, by 
encroaching market economics and materialism on the one hand, and by scepticism 
and relativism on the other. The consequent loss of a sense of higher purpose 
produces the cultural emptiness in society and the limited aims that pervade higher 
education today. Of course, in this, universities are mimicking wider society but, at 
one time, it was thought to be a role of universities to question and draw attention to 
alternative ways of thinking about society. However, the collapse of what one could 
term the ‘high culture’ of universities has far deeper roots than the narrowing of 
educational intent in a local event such as the publication of the White Paper. The 
difficulty arises from changing cultural attitudes in wider society and the fact that 
there is no purely secular basis that validates the disinterested life of the mind. This is 
expressed by George Steiner: 
The thrust of will which engenders art and disinterested thought, the engaged response which 
alone can ensure its transmission to other human beings, to the future, are rooted in a gamble on 
transcendence.27  
That ‘gamble on transcendence’, as Steiner puts it is, indeed, a gamble, and has little 
purchase in our current world of immediacy, material values, and simplistic 
responses. Nevertheless, the ‘gamble on transcendence’ permeates science itself, and 
was recognised by Isaac Newton when, in his ‘Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy’ he 
wrote:  
…nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which is…always consonant with itself.28  
This rule of reasoning of Newton’s is not subject to logical demonstration, but rather 
is based on custom and necessity. As well, Bertrand Russell says: 
…logical knowledge is not derivable from experience alone.29 
Looked at another way, Russell is saying that knowledge derived only from 
experience has an element of incompleteness. The views of Newton and Russell point 
to the transcendent foundations of scientific knowledge, in the sense that those 
foundations are not fully accessible to reason, and so require a type of acceptance and 
belief lying beyond reason. This neither implies that such acceptance is unjustified, 
nor that all belief is on the same level. 
In the declining perception of common, transcending values, public discourse 
and policy are being reduced to market values, whereby opinion poses as knowledge 
and is designed to appeal to a group of the like-minded -- in effect, that is an aspect of 
the wider message of market economics, and it produces an attitude of relativism. 
Thus, the wider message of market economics has practical epistemological 
consequences, for there is little market for truth in modern capitalism. But as well, 
and coming from a completely different perspective, the postmodern idea that claims 
to knowledge are spurious and in any case are little more than exercises in power also 
confirms the relativist outlook, and we have the irony that the so-called ‘left’ and 
‘right’ have much in common. Under combined assaults, words, reason, intangible 
qualities and the concept of truth are losing their purchase and force of persuasion. 
There is a consequent cultural emptiness in our society which, in education, in the 
management of organisations, in public discussion, and in wider culture is discussed 
variously by Alvesson30, Alvesson and Spicer31, Bloom32, Collini33, Connell34, 
Enzenberger35, Gare36, Lasch37, Lewis38, Nillsen39, Saunders40, Steiner41, Vargas 
Llosa42, Sokal and Bricmont 43, Vinsel and Russell44, Wheen45, and others. 
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In the old educational culture little was said but much implied, while in the new 
much is said but little implied. In the old culture, an academic’s loyalty was felt to lie 
beyond the employing institution. In the new, an academic’s loyalty is expected to 
belong to the employing university as a business. This does not absolutely deny 
academic freedom, but it severely diminishes it. It was a weakness of the old culture 
that it could not articulate a higher sense of the worth of education and knowledge, 
without which education simply becomes training and the acquisition of facts and 
information. This meant that under a delayed, unprecedented assault, the weakness of 
the old culture could not withstand the new, and little attempt was made to resist the 
ideas in the government’s new policies of 1988. In any case, change was necessary, as 
technology was creating a more complex society, ‘globalisation’ was raising the bar 
in international economic competitiveness, and employability required more advanced 
knowledge and skills. In such circumstances, an increase in student numbers, changes 
in the composition of the student body, and a greater general participation of people in 
higher education were inevitable. What was not inevitable was the manipulation of 
language, the uninformed management practices, and the new attitudes to teaching, to 
research, and to academic staff that occurred -- these now are regarded implicitly as 
inseparable from the basic functions of universities, creating layers of sameness and 
conformity. The marketing mentality now dominates universities outside of its 
legitimate domain, in much the same way as it dominates wider society. The new 
culture typically protects itself against description and analysis on the basis that any 
critical analysis can only be due to the critic’s resistance to change and nostalgia for a 
defunct culture. This is simplistic but convenient nonsense. The fact that there were 
serious problems in the old culture provides no reason whatsoever to ignore the 
description, analysis and problems of the new.  
Despite the magnitude of the changes in educational culture and the dominance 
of academic life by management, academics generally have carried out their teaching 
well in demanding circumstances. There remains good reason to think that education 
intrinsically resists the notion that it is a mere commodity 46 and that it may resist, 
even for some time, the forces that act to limit it. The future of universities remains 
uncertain, the older vision of knowledge and intellectual endeavour has collapsed, and 
there is no going back to an imagined ideal academic world. However, one can hope 
that the new may show sufficient awareness of the better parts of the old so that, from 
time to time, it may respond to its own imaginative and practical limitations. One 
might say, with Tennyson’s Ulysses: ‘Tho' much is taken, much abides.’ 
 
Acknowledgement and author’s postscript: The author is indebted to the referee for making a number 
of suggestions that have helped to clarify aspects of this paper. As well, the referee commented: ‘The 
discussion of liberal economics and postmodernism is relevant to the new ‘post-truth’ world and can be 
seen to be evidence that post-truth is not something new, but just the inevitable development of those 
forces.’  The author agrees. The ‘post-truth’ world has been latent and developing for some decades, 
although more widely recognised only recently.  
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